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ATTORNEY AND CLIMNT.

The following statement from the syllabus of an opinion of
the Supreme Court of Louisiana is of much wider operation
than the provisions of a civil code: "JurispruAmount o
Attorney's dence has settled the rule, and consecrated it, that
the quantum of attorney's fees in any case where
Fees,
Determined the services have been performed in the presence
by the Court of the court which is called upon to decide the
question is a matter of law rather than one of fact, and that it
will value the same as its opinion, and sound discretion dictate
rather than base its judgment upon the opinion of witnesses."
Succession of Rabasee, 25 So. 326.
Notice, in connection with this, Judge Sharswood's opinion
in Daly v. Maidand,88 Pa. 384 (affirmed Lindley v. Ross, I37
Pa. 633), to the effect that an even stipulation for an attorney's
commission, inserted in a mortgage, is rather in the nature of
a penalty than of liquidated damages, and is subject to the
control and discretion of the court-not of the jury.
BANKRUPTCY.

Although, of course, superseding state insolvent laws
proper, it is pretty well settled that a national bankrupt law
does not affect an ordinary assignment for the
Effect on
State Insol- benefit of creditors: Boese v. King, io8 U. S. 379.
This was followed in State v. Superior Court of
vent Law
King County, 56 Pac. (Wash.) 35, where it was held that, no
bankruptcy proceedings having been instituted, the power of
the State Court to appoint a receiver to wind up the affairs of
an insolvent corporation was undoubted.
In re Price, 91 Fed. 635, decides that, under § 7 (9) of the
bankrupt law, the right to examine the bankrupt is not
Examination limited to any particular time, and hence the cteditors were allowed to do so in order to ascertain whether there
was any ground to oppose his discharge. Quwre, whether
decision would be the same if the bankrupt had already been
,xamined.
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

Mitchell v. McClure, 91 Fed. 621, is'the first decision on
what is likely to be a much disputed question, viz., How far
Jurisdiction of have the United States Courts jurisdiction under
District Court the new law of suits by receivers or trustees ?
This was a replevin by a receiver in the District Court to
recover personal property.
All parties were residents of
Pennsylvania. Motion to abate the writ was granted by Buffington, D. J., on the ground that under § 23 (b) the suit
should have been in the Common Pleas Court. The judge
relied on Morgan v. Thushill, i i Wall. 75 ; Smitl v. Maso,
14 Wall. 43 o , and Maisbellv. Knox, x6 Wall. 556; grid, intimating a doubt whether any section of the present act confers
jurisdiction of plenary suits upon the District Court, held that,
even if the court had such jurisdiction, it was limited by § 23
(b), by the right of the defendant to remove to State Court
BANKS AND BANKING.

Ordinarily a deposit in a bank makes the money deposited
the property of the bank, which becomes the debtor of its
depositor. Not so when the depositor is a state
Deposit f.
Bank,
official, who, as the bank is bound to know, has
Public Money no authority to make the deposit. Although entered generally, the deposit in law is then a special one, which
can be followed into the hands of the bank's receiver: State
v. Thum, 55 Pac. (Idaho) 858.
CONTRACTS.
M entered into a contract with the Eastern Advertising
Company, whereby the company agreed to display adverAssignment tising cards of M in certain street cars for one
year, the cards to be "subject to approval of the Eastern Advertising Company as to style and contents."
Held, that
this was a contract where skill and judgment as well as taste
were required to be exercised by the advertising company,
both in the designing of the cards and in selecting the type
in which they were to be printed, and in the arrangement of
the cards in the cars, and was, therefore, not assignable by the
company: Eastern Advertising Co. v. MGaw (Court of Appeals of Maryland), 42 Atl. 923.
A sold land to B, representing to B that he (A) had paid a
certain price for it. This statement was untrue. No confidential
Misrepresen- relations existed between A and B, but they had
tation.,
been acquainted with each other for several years.
Acquaintance In an action by A against B to'recover the pur-
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chase price, B testified that A took advantage of their acquaintance and friendly relations to accomplish the sale
Held, that a direction to the jury to find for the plaintiff was
error: Dorr v. Cory (Supreme Court of Iowa), 78 N.W. 682.
A, a workman, was injured in the service of B, and, in
compromise of his claim against B for damages, an agreement
c...t
. was made between them by which B was to pay
Wn
to A regular wages while he was disabled, and
also to furnish him certain supplies. Subsequently this agreement was modified by a stipulation that B should give A
such work as he could do, should pay him therefor wages of
16o per month, and later the parties entered into another
contract, by which, after reciting A's claim for damages and
the previous agreements, it was agreed that, in lieu of the
above propositions, A's "wages from this date are to be $65
a month," A agreeing, on his part, to release B from all
claims he might have against B. In an action by A against B
on this contract, held, that this was not a hiring from month
to month, terminable at the pleasure of either party, but was a
contract to pay A $65 so long as his disability existed, he
being bound to do such work as he could: Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., 19 Sup. Ct. 335.
CRIMINAL LAW.

The question of former jeopardy was before the Supreme
Court of South Dakota, in State v. Adams, 78 N. W. 353.
The defendant was convicted of rape on a female
ormer
under the age of sixteen years, and his application
Jeopardy.
Rape
for a new trial was refused; but, inasmuch as the
evidence showed that the female was over sixteen years of
age at the time the offence was alleged to have been committed, the court, on its own motion, arrested the judgment and
ordered the defendant to be held in custody for ten days,
during which a second information was flied against him
charging the same offence, with the exception that the date
of the commission of the offence wag earlier (in order to make
its commission within the sixteen years). Held, that a plea of
former jeopardy should be sustained.
DECEDENTS'

STATS.

Paddfora'sEstate, 42 At. (Pa) 287, settles a point in Pennsylvania practice. The residuary legatee, though
Right to
Administer disqualified to act as administrator by non-residence, was, nevertheless, held entitled to nominate an administrator.

PROGfIS

OP THE-LAW.

EVIDENCE.

-

The case of Bruend's Will (S. C. Wisconsin), 78 N. W.
169, contains an interesting decision upon the interpretation of
Competency a statute regulating the admission of testimony of
of Physicians attending physicians. The statute provided that
tO Tertfy no physician, should disclose information, acquired
wiscosina
Statute

professionally while attending a patient, which

. was "necessary " to enable him "to prescribe for

such patient as physician." The court held that the statute,
while it should be construed liberally, still, being in derogation
of the common law, should not be enlarged further than the
legislative intent required. It applied to all information given
by a patient bearing on his condition which would aid the
physician to fully comprehend it, so that he might "prescribe,
for it "-in the most liberal sense of the term, not merely that
he might prescribe me(icines, but might take any steps or
direct any course of conduct or regime loolng to the improvement of the patient's health, mental or physical. But
the statute did not apply to exclude evidence of a physician's examination, when made not for the purpose of applying remedial measures, but only to ascertain the patient's
condition for some other purpose-as her6---to discover if her
mental condition was such as to render it advisable that she
resume control of her property.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYAICES.

In Michigan the legislature has remedied a defect in the
common law by enacting that an administrator may pursue
Right of Ad. for the benefit of creditors property which has
ministrator been conveyed to defraud them. In Beith v.
Porter,78 N. W. (Mich.) 336, the statute was libto Sue
erally construed so as to apply to a case where the decedent
had never had title himself, having taken title in his wife's
name.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.

Xv. Y, [1899] i Ch. 526, is an important case. A man
died, having by his will appointed his widow and his father
testamentary guardians of his son, with survivorGuardians,
Appointment ship. The father died; the widow married a
of
Roman Catholic (th6 other parties in interest all
being Protestants), and the child's grandmother now applies to
court, under Act of I886, for appointment of another guardian to act with the mother. Admitting their power in the
premises, the court, nevertheless, refused to act, holding that
their power was only to be exercised for the benefit of the
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child, and there was nothing to show that the child needed
any additional guardian.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

A married woman's stattis has not been and should not be
changed so far as to permit her to sue her husband on ordinary contracts. The importance of Pennsylvania
Suit by
Wife Against Act, 1893, P. L. 345, § 3, forbidding such suits, is

Husband illustrated in Hann v. Trainer,42 AtI. (Pa.) 367,
where an affidavit was held sufficient, which set forth that
the plaintiff sued as assignee of the wife only to escape the
operation of this Statute.
New Jersey has recently (Atlantic City. Co. v. Goodin, 4z
Atl. 333), renewed allegiance to the doctrine that, -in the ab.
common Law sence of statutory prohibitions, common law marMarriage
riage by verba deprasent"are still valid, and this
in spite of cases like Voorhees v. Voorhees, 46 N. J. Eq. 4 11,
holding that cohabitation and reputation will not justify a presumption of marriage, where the relation started by one of
the parties, himself married, tricking the other into the performance of a marriage ceremony.
A safe rule was adopted with respect to foreign divorces in
Magowan v. 171agowan, 42 Atl. (N. J.) 330, where the court
decided that, admitting the divorce decrees of anForeign
other state to be entitled to as much respect as
Divorce,
any other judgments, yet it was still eligible for
Validity
the injured party to show that the decree had been obtained
by imposing false jurisdictional facts upon the foreign court.
INFANCY.

Hilton v. Shepherd 42 AtI. (Me.) 387, involved the question
what act on the part of an infant amounted to a ratification of
his voidable contract, and it was easily held that
Infant's
contract, his sale of the horses purchased by him after
Ratification coming of age was such ratification as prevented
him from recovering the consideration paid by him.
LIBEL AND SLANDER.

In a suit for slander after the plaintiff's witnesses had testified to the speaking of the words charged in the petition,
without saying anything as to the language in
Slander,
Presumption which the words were spoken, the defendant in-

that the

troduced some evidence to the effect that the Irish

Spoken in
English

language was used. The court below in instructing the jury said: "The words charged are

Words were
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charged to have been spoken in the English language. So
that, to entitle the plaintiff to recover in this action, it must
appear that these words were spoken in the English tongue.
If. spoken in a foreign tongue, there can be no recovery in the
petition in this case, for it is not claimed .they were spoken in
a foreign language, and no translation is given." . . . "The
presumption, I think, is that they were spoken in the English
tongue, and in the absence of proof to the contrary, the jury
would be justified in assuming, then, the words were spoken
in the English tongue, if spoken at all." Held, by the Supreme Court of Ohio, that this was not error. "This," said
Burket, J.," is an English-speaking nation, and our courts and
schools use that language, and the natural presumption is that
English was used until the contrary is made to appear."
I-eeney v. Kilbane, 32 N. E. 262.

MASTER AND SERVANT.
In England the legislature has intervened to relieve the
eniploye from the common-law rules. Lowe v.'Pkarson,[1899]
B--ploymr'
I Q. B. 261, shows, however, the disposition of
Liability
the courts still to protect the employer. It was
there held that the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897
did not apply to the case of a boy injured by machinery which
it was no part of his duty to touch.

MORTGAGEES.

A mortgage may be reformed to correspond in material details with the note for which it is security; nor is there any
Reormation duty imposed upon the mortgagee to examine the
papers, such as will deprive him of his right to
reformation, if he fails to examine: Tarke v. Bingham, 55 Pac.
(Cal.) 759.
The difficulties that surround the unwholesome practice of
,conveying property absolutely when the transaction is really
.Bil to
intended as a loan are illustrated in the case of
.ed"em Bourgeois v. Gapen, 78 N. W. (Neb.) 639. Upon
-bill filed to redeem, though the mortgagee had tried to take
advantage of his nominal title, it was, nevertheless, held that
the mortgagor should be charged with all disbursements necessary to carry out the original understanding of the parties.
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It is well settled that a holder of an assignment of, a mortgage as collateral security is entitled to receive 'payment of it
Rights of and give a valid discharge; particularly can theie
be no doubt when the assignment contains an exAssignee,
press authority. Hence, in Lowry v. Bennett, 77
Discharge
N. W. (Mich.) 935, it was held that a discharge by the assignee by mistake bound the mortgagee as against-an innocentpurchaser who relied on the discharge.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

A police jury, having ordered an election whereat was submitted the question of ihe levy of a special tax in aid of a
Railroads, railway, to be constructed through the parish, andMunicipalAid having compiled the returns and declared that the'
tax had been voted for by a majority of the qualified voters,.
and having formally adopted an ordinance levying the tax, is.
without legal capacity to pass another ordinance repealing the"
former one and annulling the tax, the railway having in the
meantime been built: Missouri K. & T. Trust Co. v. Smart
(Supreme Court of Louisiana), 25 So. 443.
A statute of Michigan provides that when the council of a
city shall, by resolution, declare that it is expedient to have
Contracts, waterworks constructed, and that it is inexpedient
for the municipality to build such works, a water
Estoppel
company may be organized. In an action on a contract to
recover for water furnished to the city, it appeared that the
contract recited the adoption of the resolution provided for in
the statute; that the contract had been approved by the
council; that the parties had acted under it for sixteen years,.
and that the company had expended large sums on the faith
of it. Held, that the city was estopped to deny its power to
enter into the contract on the ground that no resolution was,
in fact, passed: Luddington Water Supply Co. v. City of Luddington (Supreme Court of Michigan), 78 N. W. 558.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, following a well-established rule of the law of municipal corporations, has decided,
Power to in Black v. Common Council of Detroit, 78 W. W.
Contract 66o, that a city has no implied or incidental power
to enter into contracts requiring the expenditure of money for
entertainments or celebrations, and that the city is not liable
even to a bona fide contractor who furnishes goods for such.
entertainment.
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NEGLIGENCE.

In Fletcher v. P/dla. Traction Co., 42 At. 527, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that a street car company is not
bound to instruct a conductor of nine years' exStreet Ca,
Master'sDuty

to Instruct

perience, when taking out, for the first time, an

open summer car, with a running board on the
side, whereby it was extended nearer cars on the
other track, of the danger of being struck by such while on
such board.
The deceased had been a conductor for nine years, but had
always operated a closed car. He was given on this occasion
an open car, and shortly after starting on the trip, a violent
thunderstorm arose and he went along the running board to
pull down the curtains at the sides. Just at that moment a
closed car passed, a crash was heard, and he was found dead
on the roadbed. The marks upon his body indicated that he
had been struck by the passing car. The negligence alleged
was in not notifying the deceased of the danger incident to the
passage of an open and closed car on tracks only 37Y2 inches
apart. The Supreme Court held that the company was not
bound to notify the conductor of the above danger. The
danger was as obvious to him as to any one else, and he was
neither young nor inexperienced, arid, therefore, no recovery
would be allowed.
Conductor

It is now becoming well understood that an employer may
be liable for the work of an independent contractor, to wit, in
Independent those cases where he has ordered the doing of a
Contractors thing which, when done, is an interference with the
rights of others. In Holliday v. NationalTelephone Co., [1899]
I Q. B. 221, it was held, however, that this does not apply to
a company which has employed an independent contractor to
connect the tubes in which its wires were threaded. The negligence of a servant of the contractor in using a defective
lamp about the work was purely collateral to the undertaking
and for it the company was not responsible.
OBITUR DICTUM.

In Brown v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin finds it necessary to distinguish between what is
,,Obiter" and '"decided in a case" and what is mere obiter dicta.
"Judicial" ".
It is a mistaken opinion," says the court, "that
Dicta
nothing is decided in a case except the result arrived at. All the propositions assumed by the court to be
within the case, and all the questions presented and consid-
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ered and deliberately decided by the court leading up to the
final conclusion reached, are as effectually passed upon as the
ultimate questions solved. Nothing is obiter, strictly so called,
except matters not within the questions presented-mere
statements or observations by the judge who is writing the
opinion-the result of turning aside, for the time, to some collateral matter by way of illustration." The court then quotes,
with approval, what is said by Bouvier: "It is difficult to see
why, in a philosophical point of view, the opinion of the court
is not as persuasive on all the points which were so involved
in the cause that it was the duty of counsel to argue them,
and which were deliberately passed over by the court, as if
the decision had hung upon but one point. Such dictum, if
dictum it is, should be regarded as 'judicial dictum,' in contradistinction to mere obiter dictum:" 78 N. W. 771.
PARENT AND CHILD.

Statutes regulating contracts of apprenticeship usually provide that they must be signed by the minor. In Anderson v.
ApprenticeYoung, 32 S. E. (S. C.) 448, it was held that such
ship
a contract, though not signed by the minor and
therefore voidable by him, was nevertheless binding on the
parent, who had executed it; and if the contract appeared to
be carried out so as to benefit the infant, the parent could not,
by reason of the child's failure to sign, regain the custody of
the child.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has recently decided that
under the statute of that state providing for replevin, which
Replevin,
requires an affidavit by the plaintiff setting forth
Under Statute

of wiscon a,
Will Not Lie
fora Dead

that "his personal goods and chattels" have been
unlawfully taken or are unlawfully retained, and
for judgment for defendant when plaintiff fails in

Body
his case for a return of the property or its value,
replevin will not lie to recover the body of plaintiff's brother in
the hands of an undertaker, to whom it had been delivered by
the authorities of a hospital. The court refers to the English
cases that there can be no property in a human body, and to
the American cases which maintain a quasi-property, and also
to cases in equity of the prevention of interference with the
control of the dead body by persons not entitled; but the decision is based upon the statute above cited: Keyes v. Kunkel,
79 N. W. 649.
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The United States Circuit Court for the Northern District
of New York, in a suit in equity for alleged infringement of a
Excessive and patent, after examining the record, concluded that

Irrelevant

Testimony

a successful defendant who had overloaded the
record with a large amount of matter, mainly by

Cause for
teductionof the testimony of " too many experts and they talk

costs In

too much," the testimony abounding "in repetition
and irksome and prolix disquisitions," should be
denied costs in the proportion which such testimony bore to the whole amount of evidence in the record:
Edison Co. v. E. G. Bernard Co., 91 Fed. 694.
Equity of

ucssul
Party

Those who have been actively engaged in the trial of cases will
appreciate the following right of control, by a trial judge, of
ArZuments of the argumentslof counsel to juries, asserted by the
Counselto Supreme Court of New Jersey. It sometimes has
Jury,

Control of been the course of counsel, of successful persuaCourt Over sive powers, in making the first speech for the
plaintiff, to restrict himself to a brief outline and reserve his
strength and eloquence for the reply. To avoid the influence
of the "last word," counsel for defence have often waived the
right to speak, preferring to keep silent rather than give the
opponent the benefit of his prepared and forceful address.
'he ruling (March, x899) was to this effect: When, in the
summing up to the jury, the defendant's counsel refuses to
reply to the opening argument on behalf of the plaintiff on
account of its meagre and unsubstantial character-although
the customary practice is not to allow the plaintiff to make a
second argument-it is within the discretion of the court to
permit the making of a second argument by the plaintiff; "or,
to state it more accurately, to make a fuller and more complete opening." If such permission is granted, the defendant
has a right to be heard in reply to such further address; and,
if he exercise that right, the plaintiff is then entitled to make
the closing argument: New York & L. B. R. R. Co. v. Gar?ity, 42 At. 842.
A recent ruling of the United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, seems clear from the nature of the subject and
Federal Court well supported by authority.

It is to the effect

Order Deny- that, when leave to intervene in an equity case is

Ing Leave to asked and refused, the order made denying leave
Intervene
to intervene is not regarded as a final determination of the merits of the claim on which the inter-
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vention is based, but leaves the petitioner at full liberty to
assert his rights in any other appropriate form -of proceeding.
An appeal cannot lie from such orders. They lack finalitr.
" It is usually said of them that they cannot be reviewed, because they merely involve an exercise of the discretionary
power of the trial court. In cases, however, where a denial
of the right of a third party to intervene would be a practical
denial of a certain relief, to which the intervener is fairly entitled and can only obtain by an intervention, the order of denial
is not discretionary, and will generally furnish the basis of an.
appeal :" Credits Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. 570.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

Hall v. Murdock, 78 N. W. (Mich.) 329, is a recent example of the familiar principle that an agent's admissions do
Admissions of not bind his principal, unless within the scope of
Agent
his employment; hence an agent's admission that
an elevator cable is defective is not evidence in a suit for damages for an injury caused by the breaking of the cable.
It has long been well settled that parol evidence is admissible to prove that the nominal party to a written contract is
Proof of
only an agent, for the purpose of conferring either
Agency
benefits or liability upon the real principal (though
not, of course, for the purpose of exempting the nominal
agent from liability): Accord, Smith v. Felter, 42 At. (N. J.)
1053.
PROPERTY.

The question of proprietorship in corpses is an interesting
one. O'Donnell v. Slack, 55 Pac. (Cal.) 759, throws some
Dead Bodies, light upon it. It was there held that, as the deceRight of
dent had not asserted his own right to determine
Burial
where he should be buried, that belonged to his
next of kin-here his wife-and she could determine it without
respect to the wishes of the executor, although the expenses
should, of course, be paid by the latter.
REAL PROPERTY.

In M7attes v. Frankel, 32 N. E. 585 (New York), a vendor
took the vendee over the property before the sale and pointed
Right of way out to him a way to a barn, which was part of
the property. This way had been used for thirty years. The
deed did not mention the way. After the conveyance the
vendor brought an action for a trespass by the vendee in the

46
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use of this way. By a divided court it was held that the way
passed as appurtenant to the property, and that the vendor
was estopped to deny the vendee's right to its use.

RECEIVERS.

Following 27winas v. Car Co., 149 U. S. 95, it was held in
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Central Vermont Co., 91 Fed. 569,
interest n that the creditors whose claims were preferred in
Preferred
the order appointing a receiver were not entitled
Claims
to interest on their. claims, the delay being due to
a stay by the court, and therefore itot furnishing any foundation for damages.
SALES.

A, having sold goods to B, rescinded the sale on discovering that B was insolvent, and instituted an action of replevin
to recover said goods. Held, that A need not, as
Rescission,
Return of a condition precedent to rescission, have returned
Consideration to B drafts drawn on B for the price of the goods
and accepted by him, such drafts being worthless and still in
A's possession: Skinner v. Midclgan Hoop Co. (Supreme
Court of Michigan), 78 N. W. 547.
A, knowing of the existence of phosphate beds on land of
B, of which B was ignorant, procured a conveyance from B
on the faith of representations that the land was
Fraud,
Expressions valuable only for the timber that was on it, and
as to Value that A wanted the land to add to land of his own
by Vendee
to complete a body of timbered land to
sell as
such. B lived in Connecticut and A near the land in question. On bill to set aside the conveyance, held, that though
A was not bound to disclose any facts affecting the value of
the land, yet having undertaken to do so, he must disclose the
whole truth. Cancellation decreed: Stackpole v. Rancock
(Supreme Court of Florida), 24 So. 914.
In Maxwell v. State, 25 So. 235, the Supreme Court of
Alabama decides that a person receiving apples
Liquors,
to be distilled into brandy on shares does not, by
Sale, Git or delivering to the owner of the apples his portion
Disposition
of the product, violate a law which prohibits the
Intoxicating

sale, gift or other disposition of intoxicants.
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SURETYSHIP.

Some nice deductions from elementary law are seen in

Hailock v. YankeY, 78 N. W. (Wis.) i56, holding (i) that a
Surety,

surety for a corporation cannot claim to be discharged by the extension of time given the corporation, when he, as officer of the corporation, had himself
obtained the extension, and (2) that when one co-surety is
discharged, the other co-surety is discharged to the extent of
one-half of his debt, being the additional damage which he
would otherwise suffer by the discharge of the first co-surety.
Discharge of

Greenwoodv. Francis,[1899] I Q. B. 313, just touches on
a nice point of law, viz., whether an agreement by a surety to
Agreement give time to the principal discharges a co-surety;
for Time
but the case turned on another point, as the mortgage which had been assigned by the creditor to the plaintiff
surety expressly provided that no extension by the creditor
should affect his rights against the sureties.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chamblee, 25 So. 232,
the Supreme Court of Alabama decides that a contract with a
Contract to telegraph company releasing the company from
Repeat
damages for mistakes in transmitting messages,
Message,
unless the sender requires the message to be reDuty of
peated, is invalid as being "induced by a species
Sender
of moral duress."
The court also holds that the sender of a telegram owes no
duty to the telegraph company to inquire whether his message
was correctly transmitted and received, and in an action against
the company for negligence in transmission, contributory negligence cannot be imputed to him for not so inquiring.

